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Politeness, Paris and the Treatise
Mikko Tolonen
Abstract: This article analyses Hume’s notion of politeness as developed in a 
letter he wrote in Paris in 1734 and the account of the corresponding artificial 
virtue in the Treatise. The analysis will help us understand Hume’s admira-
tion for French manners and why politeness is presented as one of the central 
artificial virtues in the Treatise. Before the Treatise, Hume had already sided 
with Bernard Mandeville’s theoretical outlook which stood in contrast to the 
popular eighteenth-century understanding of politeness as a natural quality 
of human nature. In the Treatise, Hume developed these notions about the 
artificial nature of politeness into one of the cornerstones of his account of 
human sociability.
The first known examination of politeness by David Hume occurs in a letter written 
in Paris in 1734.1 In the letter, Hume tells his addressee that he has been instructed 
to pay close attention to French manners. Hume’s mentor in Paris was the Che-
valier Ramsay, who, according to Hume, based his advice on the assumption that 
“the English” might “have more of the real Politeness of the Heart,” while “the 
French” have “a better way of expressing it.” In his letter, however, Hume dismisses 
the idea of politeness of heart and opposes Ramsay’s hypothesis by stating that it 
is actually the “French” that have “more real politeness.”2 The aim of this paper 
is to examine what Hume meant when he put this argument forward, and to use 
this analysis to understand his overall idea of politeness.
I will take Hume’s intellectual context as my point of departure by briefly dis-
cussing the contemporary debate over the nature of politeness. I will subsequently 
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address the question of how Hume’s early analysis fits into this interpretative 
framework. Politeness has played an important role in eighteenth-century scholar-
ship. The well-known thesis, proposed in the influential work of John Pocock, is 
that politeness modified republican thinking by broadening the strict definition 
of virtue and, in a sense, rendered it suitable for the modern world.3 A number of 
scholars have followed suit and maintained that in early eighteenth-century Britain 
a new concept was coined that replaced the old idea of civic virtue and dominated 
subsequent accounts of politeness in the age of Enlightenment.4 Because this line 
of interpretation takes politeness to be a form of “virtuous sociability,” it lends cre-
dence to the claim that classical republicanism retained its position as the leading 
intellectual tradition in an increasingly commercial age. John Pocock originally 
argued that “Whig ideology,” at the beginning of the eighteenth-century, “took 
a decisive turn toward social, cultural, and commercial values, one we associate 
especially with the name of Addison.”5 Lawrence Klein elaborated on this point 
by shifting the focus to the third earl of Shaftesbury,6 whom he linked to “the civic 
tradition in English political discourse.”7
David Hume has played an important part in this line of scholarship, which 
has linked him in particular to Shaftesbury and Addison. It has been argued that 
when Hume turns from his philosophical texts to the writing of polite essays, a 
clear change takes place, and indeed that “Hume turned to the business of Ad-
disonian moralizing immediately after completing the Treatise in 1740.”8 This 
paper will advance an alternate thesis.9 I agree that politeness is a central concept 
for Hume, but I think that this has little to do with the idea of virtuous sociabil-
ity. I will therefore examine Hume in an alternative context, one which connects 
Hume’s conception of politeness to Bernard Mandeville, and which will further 
help us understand some important aspects of his moral philosophy.
i
It is important to recognise that the expression used by Ramsay, “real Polite-
ness of the Heart,” is a critical definition at the core of the eighteenth-century 
controversy over politeness. At the turn of the century, Shaftesbury launched a 
campaign to redefine the principles of civil conversation.10 His prime instrument 
was a resolute affirmation that the false “language of the court” had finally been 
“banished” from “the town, and all good company.”11 He attacked feigned polite-
ness for harming civil society by causing men not to be “contented to show the 
natural advantages of honesty and virtue.”12 He denounced dissimulation and 
the hypocritical nature of politeness. It is the innate quality that has to shine 
through outward gestures. Although education and polishing the rough edges 
in children plays a role in his thinking, for Shaftesbury, real politeness is polite-
ness of the heart.
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Shaftesbury was, unquestionably, the theorist who popularised the idea of 
“politeness of the heart,” but it was the trendy journalists of the Tatler and the 
Spectator who vigorously advanced the idea that this noble quality is particularly 
English. A staple argument of these Addisonians was that artificiality corrupts true 
moral qualities and renders the French morally inferior to the English. Another 
significant part of the Spectator’s program was to campaign for true politeness. 
“False delicacy,” which is “Affectation,” should not be called “Politeness” at all.13 
It is uncomplicated for Addison and Steele to identify the source of false politeness. 
According to the Spectator, a “Frenchman” is the personification of “vanity.”14 The 
Spectator wishes “heartily” that “there was an Act of Parliament for Prohibiting the 
Importation of French Fopperies” in order to prevent “great Evils.” In his outline 
of politeness, Mr Spectator draws a close connection between truth, virtue and 
modesty.15 Real modesty, the core of good breeding, is carefully distinguished from 
dissimulation. True politeness, which “is opposed to Corruption and Grossness,” 
has to consist of nothing “but Truth and Virtue.”16
Bernard Mandeville opposed these accounts of virtuous sociability.17 We 
should acknowledge here that Mandeville was not merely a polemical figure 
but also a worthy interlocutor who, in his later works, dropped his earlier Hob-
bist stance along with the idea that all moral distinctions are invented by clever 
politicians. Instead of a straightforward egoistic theory, he sought to outline the 
conjectural development of civil society and two of its central moral institutions, 
justice and politeness.
These claims go against the consensus among Mandeville scholars, who have 
often emphasised the unity of his thought.18 Maurice Goldsmith, for example, has 
stressed that because of this unity “the skilful politician need not be taken literally” 
and it is “a Mandevillean fictive literary device.”19 In contrast, my interpretation 
of the 1714 Fable of the Bees (and the second edition of 1723) is that it is a Hobbist 
work where the idea of arbitrary invention of moral distinctions plays a crucial role 
along with the idea of fear as the only effective civilising method.20 A change in 
Mandeville’s ideas only takes place in Part II of The Fable of the Bees, first published 
in 1729.21 The clearest proof that, in the first part of the Fable, Mandeville advances 
a Hobbist doctrine comes from such entries as “The first rudiments of morality were 
broach’d for the ease of governors,”22 “All desires tend to self-preservation” and “Man 
is civiliz’d by his fear.”23 In other words, Mandeville manifestly claims that moral 
distinctions are artificially invented, that all human actions are centred in self-
preservation, and moreover, that fear plays a great role in taming the savage in a 
peculiarly Hobbist manner. But Mandeville drops these axioms in Part II, where 
moral distinctions are no longer considered as a straightforward artificial trick 
played by politicians upon ignorant people. The role of politicians in Part II is 
different; the definition of self-preservation changes; fear is no longer staunchly 
emphasised; and, furthermore, Mandeville admits that all human actions cannot 
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be reduced to self-love and self-preservation. Mandeville changed his position 
partly in response to the criticism that the Fable received in the 1720s.
Nevertheless, in the 1714 Fable of the Bees the arbitrary, and almost sudden, 
invention of morality is a particularly strong element underlying the central thesis. 
Mandeville does not advance here the subtle and nuanced conception of the long 
evolutionary process of civil society and moral institutions that he develops later. 
And the reason the role of politicians who artificially invent morality is so strong 
is that in every single case that he can think of, Mandeville is trying to apply a 
theory where all human actions are reduced to self-love and self-preservation. 
Mandeville was originally a Hobbist.
Let me briefly illustrate this change in Mandeville’s works. In 1725, Francis 
Hutcheson explicitly points out that in the Fable of the Bees, Mandeville’s attempt 
to explain natural affection away with selfishness is absurd, since he is forced to 
revert to an argument that “natural affection” in mothers is “weak” until their 
children are old enough to show signs of “knowledge and affections.”24 Mandeville 
consequently revises his position. In Part II, published in 1729, he willingly con-
cedes that in human nature there is at least one natural, other-regarding affection, 
or as Hume would call it, natural virtue. Mandeville describes “natural affection” 
as an attribute that “prompts all mothers to take care of the offspring they dare 
own.”25 This “natural affection” is such a powerful principle that it causes even “a 
wild man to love, and cherish his child.”26 Moreover, “natural affection” can make 
parents “sacrifice their lives, and die for their children.”27 As this example of natural 
virtue suggests, Mandeville’s later works will serve as an important backdrop for 
an examination of similar arguments presented in Hume’s Treatise.28
In Part II, Mandeville writes that it is “very unworthy of a philosopher to 
say, as Hobbes did, that man is born unfit to society.”29 It is noteworthy that here 
Mandeville is not only arguing against Hobbes but also against the principal idea 
of his own Fable.30 In the table of contents of the 1714 Fable, for example, he clearly 
states: “Man without government is of all creatures the most unfit for society.”31 After 
considering this foundational question anew, Mandeville comes to accept that ev-
ery child is born into a society of some sort, where he can perfectly well learn to be 
sociable simply by living in the society. There are also certain human propensities 
that support and guide this course of action. First of all, every “savage child would 
learn to love and fear his father.” According to Mandeville, “these two passions, 
together with the esteem, which we naturally have for every thing that far excels 
us, will seldom fail of producing that compound, which we call reverence.”32 As 
we can see, in Part II, Mandeville is no longer trying to argue that all passions are 
directly derivative of self-love. This is already a leap away from Hobbism. “Rever-
ence to authority” is “necessary, to make human creatures governable,” Mandeville 
declares.33 When one of Mandeville’s characters of the dialogue of Part II, called 
Horatio, complains to his interlocutor that in their conversation they have not 
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made any “progress” towards the origin of civil society, Cleomenes answers that 
“the introduction of the reverence, which the wildest son must feel more or less 
for the most savage father” had “been a considerable step.”34 The later Mandeville 
should, thus, not be mischaracterised as an uncompromising Hobbist.
Men may have natural virtues, but Mandeville never strayed from the idea 
that politeness is artificial. Civility does not “belong to” man’s “nature,” he states, 
in criticism of Shaftesbury and the Spectator.35 Mandeville goes on to claim that 
“men long for society” in “hopes that what they value themselves upon will at 
one time or other become the theme of the discourse, and give an inward satis-
faction to them.”36 The significance of politeness is that since everyone desires to 
cultivate the notion of his own worth, it is a clear sign of “ill-manners” to show 
“openly” one’s “selfishness without having any regard to the selfishness of the 
other.”37 Manifestations of vanity are condemned, simply because everyone is 
vain. Likewise, it is wrong to claim that politeness is a natural quality of the heart. 
As Mandeville argues, “Strictly speaking, good Manners and Politeness must” be 
denominated “hypocrisy,” since “to make a Shew outwardly of what is not felt 
within, and counterfeit what is not real, is certainly Hypocrisy, whether it does 
Good or Hurt.”38
ii
The published works of the Chevalier Ramsay, along with his advice to Hume, 
endorse the idea of politeness as virtuous sociability. Ramsay wants us to believe 
that we have an “inward principle,” by which “we will know how to distinguish 
and honour true merit.” By the help of this “inward principle” we also acquire 
“politeness” that “expresses itself by a noble freedom and easiness far remov’d from 
the everlasting ceremonies of an importunate, formal and never-ceasing civility.”39 
For Ramsay, true politeness springs from within. In his famous Travels of Cyrus, 
Ramsay also stresses the difference between inward politeness and outward civil-
ity. To him it is clear that “internal politeness is very different” from “superficial 
civility.”40 Ramsay emphasises that “external civility is but the form establish’d in 
the different countries for expressing that politeness of the soul.”41
In his letter written in Paris in 1734, the young Hume mounts a counterargu-
ment against each of Ramsay’s points. He opposes the popular idea that politeness 
is a natural quality of the heart. He thinks it unworthwhile to speculate about who 
might have more “politeness of the heart.” And he maintains that “the French” 
have “more real Politeness” than the English.42 What Hume seems to be saying 
is that this quality does not spring from within. On the contrary, politeness is 
an artificial principle that can make an imprint on someone’s character only 
through the constant application of outward gestures. It takes time for manners 
to be refined and kind expressions to become customary. Hume makes it clear 
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that “by real Politeness” he means “Softness of Temper” and the “Inclination to 
oblige & be serviceable.”43 The twenty-three-year-old Hume was convinced that 
good breeding is, above all, a deeply-rooted habit.
Habitual expressions of politeness can become a second nature, but only when 
the institution has long been established and men have become accustomed to 
being polite.44 Hume took his own experience in Paris to confirm this opinion. As 
Hume has it, “politeness” has become so “conspicuous” in France that it is “not 
only” a common feature “among the high but the low, insomuch that the Porters 
& Coachmen” (which were commonly described as the worst-mannered brutes) 
“are civil.”45 Hume is quite impressed by the fact that these vulgar men are “not 
only” polite towards “Gentlemen but likewise among themselves.”46 He testifies 
that he has “not yet seen one Quarrel in France, tho’ they are every where to be met 
with in England.”47 Hume admits that of course “the little Niceties of the French 
Behaviour” can be described as “troublesome & impertinent.” Yet, they “serve to 
polish the ordinary Kind of People & prevent Rudeness & Brutality.”48 The reason 
“you scarce ever meet with a clown, or an ill bred man in France” is that “men 
insensibly soften towards each other” while they “practise” outward ceremonies 
and “the Mind pleases itself by the Progress it makes in such Trifles,” turning into 
an actual inclination to be polite.49 In Hume’s opinion, the process here is similar 
to the development of “soldiers,” who “are found to become more courageous in 
learning to hold their Musquets within half an Inch of a place appointed.”50 Hume 
thinks that the French are more polite because they carefully follow the outward 
expressions of politeness.
In constructing his theory of politeness, one of Hume’s aims was to oppose 
moral philosophers who claim that man’s naturally virtuous nature promotes 
sociability. Hume’s targets include the Chevalier Ramsay and Shaftesbury, which 
is not to say he rejected all of their views. This becomes clear from what Hume says 
about the role of the French and the juxtaposition between ancient and modern 
civility in the Essays.
In his essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742), Hume 
draws a strong contrast between “modern politeness” and “ancient simplicity.”51 
The contrast is derived directly from what the “more zealous partizans of the 
ancients” claimed about politeness.52 The admirers of the ancients, according to 
Hume, unjustifiably mock the artificial nature of modern French manners. Authors 
stressing the superiority of “ancient simplicity” accuse “modern politeness” of “af-
fection and foppery.”53 One admirer of the Greeks that Hume singles out is “Lord 
Shaftesbury.” It should also be remarked that in “A Dialogue” in Hume’s Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) the ancient and modern counterparts are 
“an AtheniAn and a French man.”54
Hume also emphasises the superiority of French manners in his Essays as 
well as in his letter on politeness. In one of his examples, he claims that even 
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“with regard to the Stage,” the French “have far excell’d the Greeks.”55 Hume not 
only claims that “Politeness of Manners” arises “most naturally in Monarchies 
and Courts.” He takes the argument one step further claiming that “where that 
flourishes, none of the liberal Arts will be altogether neglected or despis’d.”56 
Shaftesbury’s view was that, as Klein has emphasised, “All politeness is owing to 
liberty.”57 There is therefore a clear contrast here between Shaftebury’s and Hume’s 
views about politeness.
In his emphasis on the importance of moral sentiments that eventually lead 
to a thoroughly secular moral philosophy, Shaftesbury was Hume’s predecessor.58 
But in certain specific aspects of morals, like politeness and justice, Hume and 
Shaftesbury are wide apart. On the basic principles of moral philosophy, Hutcheson 
and Shaftesbury advance a similar argument while Mandeville and Hume can be 
seen to belong to a different school. At the same time, regarding the question of 
associative principles, Hume ought to be seen as also following John Locke.59 By 
and large, I suggest, Hume turns these different aspects of his philosophical system 
to fit a Mandevillean framework where the emergence of civil society is explained 
as part of the science of man.
iii
Hume’s first analysis of politeness in the 1734 letter is consistent with the Treatise, 
in which politeness is systematically maintained to be an outward principle. On 
the other hand, the letter’s view of politeness is incomplete because it does not 
explicitly discuss self-applause or pride.
In the Treatise, Hume characterizes politeness as an outward principle directly 
related to the passion of pride. “Good-breeding,” Hume argues, requires “that we 
shou’d avoid all signs and expressions, which tend directly to show” our pride (T 
3.3.2.10; SBN 597).60 In order for everyone to be able to cultivate their pride, “we 
must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual defer-
ence in all our conduct and behaviour,” while the actual sentiment that we nurture 
might be diametrically opposite to this outward sign (T 3.3.2.10; SBN 598). Hume 
points out that “humility, which good-breeding and decency require” us to express 
does not go “beyond the outside” and it cannot be expected that “thorough sincer-
ity in this particular” would be “a real part of our duty” (T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598). In the 
Treatise, civility, good-breeding and politeness are all taken to serve the purpose 
of concealing the good opinion that we have of ourselves.
An important feature of the Treatise is that it follows Mandeville’s analysis of 
amour-propre by clearly separating self-love and self-applause, instead of vaguely 
referring to man’s selfish nature in general. Mandeville derived his distinction 
between self-love and self-liking from the French concept of amour-propre. What 
is significant about the French notion is its Augustinian background: the concept 
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of concupiscence and the conviction that human will is partially or utterly cor-
rupted.61 If we would like to describe Mandeville’s distinction between self-love and 
self-liking as a neo-Augustinian development, we might also want to point out that 
both of these passions are at the same time equally natural and excessive. Self-love 
can develop into avarice; self-liking into excessive pride. We should, however, keep 
in mind that without these passions man cannot exist. The point of view is hence 
different from the familiar division between charity and self-love.
This important distinction between self-love and self-liking should not be 
confused with the familiar division between natural self-preservation and the 
perverted attachment to the self. One of the favourite storylines of recent Rousseau 
scholarship seems to be one in which the analysis of amour-propre concentrates 
on self-love and self-interest in a sense that the excessive attraction to the self 
(amour-propre) is distinguished from the proper love of the self (amour de soi) that 
can be argued to correlate with the love of God.62 This is the familiar idea of the 
juxtaposition between charity as a theological concept and the self-love that 
corrupts it. Scholars are aware that there were different approaches to amour-
propre, concupiscence, self-love and self-interest. Many have noticed that not all 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors condemned human selfishness 
outright.63 Jean-Jacques Rousseau is usually referred to in this regard because he 
characteristically makes a distinction between proper self-preservation (instinc-
tual) and “excessive, and illusion-ridden attachment to the self.”64 This is not the 
direction of the argument I mean to advance in this paper. While placing their 
emphasis on the distinction between self-love and self-liking, Mandeville and 
Hume were not concerned with this Rousseauvian distinction between proper 
and excessive self-love.
Mandeville introduces the concept of self-liking for the first time in the third 
dialogue of Part II.65 Cleomenes instructs Horatio that “nature has given” men “an 
instinct, by which every individual values itself above its real worth.”66 Horatio 
suggests that “self-liking is evidently pride,” but Cleomenes rejects this idea.67 Self-
liking can cause pride, but only when “excessive, and so openly shewn as to give 
offence to others” it is called pride. When it is kept out of sight it has “no name,” 
even when men act “from that and from no other principle.”68 When Horatio 
maintains that the passion should be called “a desire of the applause of others,” 
Cleomenes disagrees yet again. The effects of self-love should not be designated 
as the passion and neither should self-liking be confined to its consequences.69 
Mandeville has a good reason for this move. Fundamental to Mandeville’s thought 
is the separation of the two different origins of the so-called selfish passions. In his 
Origin of Honour Mandeville also reminds his audience that self-liking is “plainly 
distinct from self-love.”70
It is striking how closely Hume follows Mandeville’s description of self-liking 
in his works, even when he does not use this precise term. In the Treatise, Hume 
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uses the terms pride, vanity, self-applause, and self-satisfaction respectively. Being 
generally unanalysable is one feature of pride or vanity. Another feature is that 
“as our idea of ourself” is “advantageous,” we feel a pleasurable affection and “are 
elated by pride” (T 2.1.2.2; SBN 277). The lifting and expanding quality of pride is 
important. To make these two points, the unanalysable quality and the expanding 
nature of pride, is to draw a picture of pride in a general sense. There are several 
different aspects (such as visible pride, haughty pride, self-satisfaction) that fall 
under the passion of pride, but it is the qualities of this uniform passion in gen-
eral that make a greater difference in understanding human nature than certain 
distinctions within the passion. Hume does not even clearly separate pride and 
self-esteem (cf. T 2.2.1.9; SBN 331–32). The reason for this is that Hume’s point is 
to emphasise what all kinds of pride have in common—even the aspects of pride 
that most people would consider as separate.
In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume indicates that when 
discussing pride and vanity, he is following Mandeville’s use of self-liking. Hume 
writes: “the sentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a 
review of man’s own conduct and character” is “the most common of all others,” 
yet it “has no proper name in our language” (EPM App. 4.3; SBN 314).71 Notwith-
standing, as early as in the Treatise, Hume—like his Dutch predecessor—adopts 
the idea that there are two original selfish passions in human nature that need 
to be regulated by strict rules in order to be cultivated: the direct “passion of self-
interest” (T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492) and the indirect passion of pride. 
The point is that these two distinct passions are the cause of the two cor-
responding moral institutions. Every civil society necessarily forms these two 
artificial moral principles, because of the passion in question. The passion that 
has to be redirected in this scheme is not only our self-love or self-interest, but also 
our self-liking or pride. Civil society, according to this outline, derived perhaps 
from Pierre Nicole and other French moralists, is built by nurturing these two 
passions—self-interest and pride.72 They are, in brief, the cause of the two cor-
responding moral institutions, justice and politeness. 
Each of these moral institutions cultivates the passion in which it originates.73 
By “fundamental laws of nature” Hume refers to justice. Laws of justice “impose” 
a “restraint” on “the passions of men.” They do not extinguish the passions. 
On the contrary, they “are only a more artful and more refin’d way of satisfying 
them” (T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526). The same holds true for politeness, where the idea is 
that “good-breeding” requires that the expressions of pride have to be avoided, 
which is not to say that people should be modest. Quite the opposite: “pride, or 
self-applause” is “always agreeable to ourselves,” and “self-satisfaction and vanity 
may not only be allowable, but requisite in a character” (T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597). Thus, 
the passions of self-interest and pride are not to be curbed but advanced, and the 
idea is merely to “prevent the opposition” of these passions, not to quench them. 
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Nevertheless, in a large society, without giving “a new direction” to these “natural 
passions” through the laws of nature and rules of good breeding, society would 
disperse (T 3.2.5.9; SBN 521).
In the Treatise and also in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume 
draws an explicit analogy between the artificial moral institutions of justice on 
the one hand and politeness on the other: “as we establish the laws of nature, in 
order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest,” 
in a like manner, “we establish the rules of good-breeding, in order to prevent the 
opposition of men’s pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive” (T 
3.3.2.10; SBN 597; see also EPM 8.1; SBN 261). The rules of politeness that prohibit 
men from showing their pride are originally formed for a similar reason as the laws 
of justice. It is “our own pride, which makes us so much displeas’d with the pride 
of other people”; we find the exposed “vanity” of others “insupportable” merely 
because “we are vain” as well (T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596).
This is the same point that Mandeville had stressed just a few years earlier. We 
have to be able to cultivate our vanity, in a similar manner as our self-love, without 
disturbing the pride of others. We are proud and vain, but it is of great importance 
that we are compelled to use artificial means to disguise these inner feelings. Ad-
ditionally, Hume is quite clear why “due pride”74 cannot make any exceptions to 
the rules of politeness: “nothing is more disagreeable than a man’s over-weaning 
conceit of himself: Every one almost has a strong propensity to this vice: No one 
can well distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and virtue, or be certain, that his 
esteem of his own merit is well-founded” (T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597–98). In this theoreti-
cal framework it was plausible to claim that not even “men of sense and merit” are 
allowed to appear proud, which is one reason why Hume does not see it as necessary 
to make a clear conceptual distinction between vanity and pride.
In Hume’s science of man it is because of the natural operation of comparison 
that we are required to hide the sentiments of esteem that we have for ourselves. 
This in turn explains why external politeness is indispensable for the convenient 
existence of a peer group.75 Hume describes pride as a passion that is “always pleas-
ant,” whereas humility is characterised as painful. He also argues that “humility” 
is considered a virtue because it “exalts” us, whereas “pride” is a vice, because it 
“mortifies us” (T 2.1.7.3; SBN 295). Here Hume is evidently referring to the effect 
of the sentiment that other people seem to entertain of themselves. It is a natural 
operation of the mind, Hume writes, that “when we compare the sentiments of 
others to our own, we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one” (T 
2.2.9.1; SBN 381). Thus, the principle of comparison will lead the appearance of 
pride in another to cause humility in us. “Through sympathy,” Hume explains, we 
“enter into those elevated sentiments, which the proud man entertains of him-
self.” Sympathy, in this case, merely denotes a mechanism by which we obtain an 
impression of the signs of the sentiment expressed by the other person. Therefore, 
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when we detect an undisguised expression of pride, the operation of sympathy 
is blocked and this leads into “comparison, which is so mortifying and disagree-
able.” Hume elaborates on this point when he maintains that “if we observe” in a 
“man, whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit” any “extraordinary 
degree of pride,” the “firm persuasions he has of his own merit, takes hold of the 
imagination, and diminishes us in our own eyes” (T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595). The idea 
that we have of this man does not change into an approving impression and we 
are forced to make a disagreeable comparison with ourselves. 
Hume describes it as an “impertinent, and almost universal propensity of 
men, to over-value themselves” (T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595). This propensity might not be 
such an unsurmountable obstacle for sympathy, if it concerned only the person 
expressing a good opinion about himself. But the inclination to over-value one’s 
worth also has implications for how one values others. It is difficult for a vain man 
to appreciate others. According to Hume, we are all more or less vain. At the same 
time, direct expressions of due pride create unpleasant humility, because we do not 
interpret the expressed pride of other people as well-founded. Instead of eulogising 
due pride, Hume acknowledges that “we have a wonderful partiality for ourselves.” 
It follows that unless we carefully conceal “our sentiments” of self-applause, we 
open the door to self-praise and “mutually cause the greatest indignation in each 
other” (T 3.3.2.10; SBN 597). Thus, Hume’s idea of politeness was opposite to the 
popular idea of opening one’s heart.
“Pride” simply “must be vicious,” because “it causes uneasiness in all men, 
and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison” (T 3.3.2.7; 
SBN 596). Another, Mandevillean way of saying this, is that a high degree of 
self-liking is recommendable and a good quality that others can appreciate, but 
once it becomes openly visible to others it is called pride and becomes vicious, 
because it diminishes the space for other people’s self-applause. Notably, we are 
talking here about equals, because the operation of the mind is different when 
greater social distance is at play. However, all that is required is the appearance 
of humility, since the passion within is vanity, pride or self-applause (depending 
on which one of these synonyms for self-liking we want to use). As Hume argues, 
“while” sentiments “remain conceal’d” in our “minds,” “they can never have any 
influence” on others (T 3.3.2.3; SBN 593). In the case of politeness, the virtue is 
a sign of deference without reference to motives or underlying true qualities. As 
Hume perceptively concludes, “no one, who duly considers of this matter, will 
make any scruple of allowing, that any piece of ill-breeding, or any expression 
of pride and haughtiness, is displeasing to us, merely because it shocks our own 
pride, and leads us by sympathy into a comparison, which causes the disagree-
able passion of humility” (T 3.3.2.17; SBN 601). Since pride is always agreeable to 
an individual and the cultivation of our self-liking is vital for our existence, every 
one should be able to be proud. Yet, since other people’s visible pride mortifies us 
Hume Studies
32 Mikko Tolonen
and causes humility, the solution is obvious: we have to be proud without directly 
showing it to others. 
Hume illustrates the point that the passion of pride only arises when the cause 
is directly related to the self by an example of a “feast” where the guests may only 
feel “joy” and not “pride” by being present, whereas the “master of the feast” is the 
only one that has “the additional passion of self-applause and vanity” (T 2.1.6.2; 
SBN 290). The fact that Hume chose to use this often-quoted example is very reveal-
ing of his idea of politeness as a method of hiding pride. In his essays, he explains 
how we are able to detect this “master of the feast” among “good company.” Most 
“certainly” he is the “man, who sits in the lowest place, and who is always indus-
trious in helping every one.”76 The master is proud, but he appears to be humble. 
Similarly, in the third book of the Treatise, Hume pins down the central feature of 
the “general rule” of not revealing our “self-applause.” In order to keep “the ap-
pearance of modesty” we have to “be ready to prefer others to ourselves” and “to 
seem always the lowest and least in the company” (T 3.3.2.10; SBN 598). By and 
large, it seems that Hume fully concurred with Mandeville that politeness only 
touches the outside and, strictly speaking, would have to be defined as hypocrisy, 
since we are showing something that is not felt within. 
***
It seems that some of the characteristics of the Treatise are similar to those that 
Mandeville started to outline in The Fable of the Bees. Part II of 1729, a book pub-
lished the year Hume said he had encountered “a new scene of thought.”77 This 
point does not serve as a key to all their secrets, but it sheds light on both of their 
works. Above all, it helps us realise that Hume’s account of politeness was struc-
tured to challenge the idea of virtuous sociability. Furthermore, the few pre-Treatise 
writings of Hume also support this interpretation.78 
A commonly-adduced piece of evidence for the nature of Hume’s early moral 
philosophy is the letter to Hutcheson of 17 September 1739 in which Hume for the 
first time makes the famous comparison between anatomist and painter of morals. 
The original letter is preserved in the National Library of Scotland and it includes 
certain important wordings that Hume decided to strike out. 
The text of the letter indicates that there is an acknowledged, major dispute 
of moral philosophy at stake. In the letter Hume clearly opposes Hutcheson. 
Since Hume is writing to Hutcheson about their dispute, it would be natural that 
he would be cautious not to align himself too squarely with the authors that 
Hutcheson vigorously opposed throughout his career. Originally when explaining 
his own position Hume wrote that “Where you pull off the Skin, & display all the 
minute Parts, there appears something trivial if not hideous, even in the noblest 
Attitudes . . . .” Hume deleted the words “if not hideous” from the letter (but did 
not make them illegible).79 These deleted words are not mentioned in Greig’s edi-
tion of Hume’s letters.80
Volume 34, Number 1, April 2008
 Politeness, Paris and the Treatise 33
Hume’s original phrasing that there is “something trivial if not hideous, even 
in the noblest attitudes” suggests a view that is closer to Hobbes and Mandeville 
than we might assume from reading the edited version of the letter. It is at the 
same time revealing and understandable that Hume deleted “if not hideous” from 
the text, even when he did not go to great lengths of making this illegible. In the 
letter he already opposes outright Hutcheson’s way of doing things (and perhaps 
even the purpose of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy). However, he was thoughtful 
enough to moderate his opinions by deleting the words that he thought would 
unnecessarily widen the already large gap between their points of view. This need 
not be a deliberate disguising of an opinion, but it seems that Hume would not have 
been too eager to put his Mandevillean ideas too bluntly to Hutcheson either.
Another important deletion occurs in a manuscript of the conclusion of Book 
3 of Treatise that is supposed to have been sent to Hutcheson.81 The draft includes 
words that have been struck out which are of particular relevance to the argument 
advanced in this article. In T 3.3.6 (SBN 618–21), Hume originally wrote: “The same 
system may help us to form a just notion of the happiness, as well as of the dignity 
of virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature, both our selfishness 
and pride, in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality.” In the letter to 
Hutcheson, Hume had deleted the thought that there is something “hideous” in 
even the “noblest attitudes.” In the conclusion of Book 3 (also supposedly sent to 
Hutcheson) he deleted “both our Selfishness & Pride” from the sentence indicat-
ing the principles of our nature. 
The fact that Hume deleted “both our Selfishness & Pride” (and not just 
selfishness or pride) is important. The deletion of “both our Selfishness & Pride” 
was (judging by its appearance) made after the manuscript had been finished. 
The problem of interpretation is that the sentence is curious.82 Selfishness and 
pride are surely not the only principles of our nature in Hume’s system. But 
perhaps we should read Hume’s use of the “every Principle of our Nature” in a 
different manner. He is not necessarily referring to all the possible principles in 
the widest meaning of the expression but merely to the most important ones. 
The sentence can be read in such a way that Hume wanted to mention only 
selfishness and pride (which is what he does). Hume does not claim that self-
ishness and pride are the only principles of our nature, but he points them out 
specifically because together they play a crucial role in his political philosophy. 
Moreover, the word “both” before “our Selfishness & Pride” gives additional 
weight to the idea that Hume is making a point of linking these two principles 
of human nature together.
Regardless of the question of whether these are the only principles of our 
nature, selfishness and pride are the only ones that are maintained, which also 
supports the case made in this article. The main argument is that Hume is following 
Mandeville in his distinction between self-love and self-liking (or selfishness and 
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pride), which is only introduced in Mandeville’s later works published in 1729 and 
1732. It is thus crucial that Hume at relevant points in his works discusses selfishness 
and pride (and the derivative moral institutions of justice and politeness) together. 
It is the connection between self-love and pride followed by the link between 
justice and politeness that is of central importance and which is only crystallized 
in Book 3 of the Treatise. If it were only pride that was important, Hume could be 
grouped with, for example, Malebranche (or a number of other French authors), 
but it is the distinction between interest and pride that makes this Mandevillean. 
For Hume, as for Mandeville, justice and politeness were interrelated moral insti-
tutions. They were also an integral part of the gradually advancing scheme of the 
conjectural history of civil society. 
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